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A B S T R A C T
Digital entrepreneurship may result in institutional turbulence and new initiatives are frequently blocked by
vested interest groups who posit superior financial and relational resources. In this paper, we explore the role of
cities in facilitating digital entrepreneurship and overcoming institutional resistance to innovation. Drawing
upon two historical case studies of digital entrepreneurship in the city of Stockholm along with an extensive
material on the sharing economy in Sweden, our results suggest that cities offer an environment that is critical
for digital entrepreneurship. The economic and technological diversity of a city may provide the field conditions
required for institutional change to take place and to avoid regulatory capture.
1. Introduction
Research in the field of entrepreneurship increasingly acknowledges
the importance of digital entrepreneurship (Del Giudice and Straub,
2011). Digital entrepreneurship facilitates the exchange, transfer and
acquisition of knowledge while also initiating new ways of doing
business. As web-based platforms enable peer-to-peer transactions and
allow novel and unique combinations of resources that generate new
products and service offerings (Amit and Zott, 2001), digital en-
trepreneurship becomes increasingly prevalent in many sectors of the
economy, giving rise to institutional conflicts as new initiatives are
frequently incompatible with formal and informal laws and regulations
governing established industries.
The platform revolution (Parker et al., 2016) and the rise of the
sharing economy constitute prominent examples of ways in which un-
used resources become utilized (Acquier et al., 2017) which create
unparalleled scalability. Apart from some notable exceptions (e.g.
Florida et al., 2016; Isenberg, 2011), little is known concerning how
digital entrepreneurship relates to its nearest geographical proximity.
Therefore, much remains in assessing the interplay between ecosystems
of digital entrepreneurship and specific spatial settings such as cities,
especially concerning the role of institutions and institutional change.
Institutional change is usually associated with considerable resistance
among vested interest groups who frequently posit superior financial
and relational resources, putting them in a position where they can
captivate regulatory processes and block changes of a more divergent
nature (Epstein, 1980; Mokyr, 2003). How is it possible for digital en-
trepreneurs to enact institutional change when facing resistance from
resourceful interest groups?
In this paper, we study how digital start-ups and scale-ups grow in a
city, in our case Stockholm and Sweden. Specifically, we explore how
and why digital entrepreneurship takes place in cities and how digital
entrepreneurs can overcome resistance. We do so by employing a mixed
methods approach, drawing upon both archival data concerning his-
torical cases and more contemporary material such as entries in social
media. While two of our cases concern the early phases of digitalization
(the 1980s) with entrant and incumbent firms in telecommunications
and financial exchanges, we combine this material with an analysis of
how the sharing economy is currently gaining momentum in Sweden.
This is done by drawing upon approximately 5000 user-generated
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content in social media concerning the Swedish sharing economy.
We conclude that cities present a potent ground for the creation of
new formal and informal institutions. The combined process of tech-
nological and institutional change that has often been invoked by di-
gital entrepreneurship seems to be more likely to occur in cities, i.e.
agglomerations where transaction costs are lowered, a diverse collec-
tion of actors are present, policymakers are more accessible and mar-
kets are more diverse. Our primary contribution therefore lies in
highlighting that cities play a critical role in overcoming institutional
barriers to digital entrepreneurship. Institutions frequently need to be
altered in order to enable the continued expansion of digital scale-ups
and cities tend to provide the field conditions required for accom-
plishing institutional change. With regards to platforms, that depend on
network effects for their growth and success, the relative density of
cities seem to offer opportunities to create and expand sharing economy
offers to new areas of society.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, we review literature on digital entrepreneurship and cities. We
then turn to our method and cases used this paper. Subsequently, re-
sults are presented and analyzed. Eventually, a discussion and a con-
cluding remark are provided.
2. Literature on digital entrepreneurship and platforms
We begin this section by providing an expanded description of di-
gital entrepreneurship, with a particular emphasis on platforms. The
following sub-section delves deeper into the role of institutions and
overcoming resistance from vested interests. We then turn to economic
geography and the role of cities while the last sub-section synthesizes
and situates our research problem in further detail.
In the information based economy, industries are to a greater extent
subject to increasing returns to adoption rather than diminishing re-
turns. As knowledge can be re-used and businesses are subject to net-
work effects by applying a platform logic, significant economies of scale
are an integral part of digital entrepreneurship (Arthur, 1996), resulting
in associated exponential changes across several sectors of society.
The emergence of digital technology and associated entrepreneur-
ship has not only sparked economic growth, but also competitive tur-
bulence and creative destruction (Christensen, 1997; Tripsas, 1997)
along with institutional change (Ernkvist, 2015; Gurses and Ozcan,
2015). Here, institutions can be defined as “the humanly devised con-
straints that structure human interaction” (North, 1991: 3) that con-
ventionally are divided into formal (laws and regulations) and informal
institutions (culture, norms and practices).
As technological change may induce changes both in the market-
place and in the institutional set-up (Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2016;
Kwon and Motohashi, 2017), digital entrepreneurship can be regarded
as a process of strategic maneuvering in both the commercial and the
institutional domain, i.e. the non-market domain. The commercial do-
main can be thought of as the marketplace where offers compete for
customers. Non-market strategy can be defined as a firm's attempts to
compete by influencing the institutional and societal context in which it
engages in market strategies of economic competition (Baron, 1995;
Lux et al., 2011), also frequently referred to as institutional en-
trepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2009). Therefore, digital start-ups and
scale-ups not only face the challenge of attracting resources such as
capital and employees while developing a competitive offer. They also
face an institutional set-up which at times require proactive transfor-
mation in order to better fit the entrepreneur's business (Berglund and
Sandström, 2017). The outcome of such processes of interrelated
technological and institutional change is highly uncertain and subject
to extensive negotiations as actors strive to create legitimacy and in-
fluence the institutional set-up to their favor (Binz et al., 2016;
Kooijman et al., 2017).
In recent years, a particular form of digital entrepreneurship has
emerged which is often referred to as the sharing economy, defined as
“ICT-enabled platforms for exchanges of goods and services drawing on non-
market logics such as sharing, lending, gifting and swapping as well as
market logics such as renting and selling” (Laurell and Sandström, 2017, p.
63). While this topic has gained extensive attention recently, there is
ample evidence that platform-based models of competition have been
around for several decades. Mobile communications and stock ex-
changes constitute two early industries where digital technology
emerged by introducing a platform logic, thereby creating technolo-
gical and institutional turbulence (Ernkvist, 2015; Sandström et al.,
2016.
The sharing economy, also frequently referred to as “collaborative
economy”, “gig economy” and “platform economy” (Mair and
Reischauer, 2017) can generally speaking be regarded as a form of
vertical disintegration where buyers and sellers meet over an ICT-
mediated platform which lowers transaction costs. In doing so, this
platform model has enabled usage of underutilized assets, and in doing
so, creating unprecedented scalability (Acquier et al., 2017).
Initially, sharing economy business models and practices were
found in the information-based economy (Belk, 2014), but has in their
contemporary manifestations grown and entered industries concerned
with physical goods and services. Examples of the sharing economy
include Uber in personal transportation and Airbnb in accommodation,
but it is clear that this business logic is presently spreading to several
other sectors of society as well. Estimations suggest that different sec-
tors of the sharing economy can jointly amount to 335 BUSD of revenue
in 2025 (PwC, 2014).
The platform revolution (Parker et al., 2016) and the rise of the
sharing economy, although not new, still constitute important mega-
trends that may alter our economy dramatically in the coming decades.
Recent contributions have shown that the sharing economy may not
only be disruptive in the technological sense, but may also distort the
institutions that govern certain industries (Laurell and Sandström,
2016; Laurell and Sandström, 2017; Mair and Reischauer, 2017) and
similar results can be identified concerning fintech firms (Bogusz et al.,
2018).
2.1. Digital entrepreneurship and institutional change
Recent contributions have also highlighted that the sharing
economy is presently characterized by conflict and tension (Murillo
et al., 2017), e.g. between market and non-market logics (Laurell and
Sandström, 2017). Sharing economy firms may therefore be char-
acterized as institutional entrepreneurs in the sense that they proac-
tively seek to transform the rules and practices governing a certain
industry, while also possibly redefining the meaning of work and the
labor market in a broader sense (Friedman, 2014; Sundararajan, 2016).
While there are several studies concerning the interplay between
firm strategies and institutional change (Ahuja and Yayavaram, 2011),
many use high-level aggregated data such as campaign contributions
(e.g. Epstein, 1980). There are recent papers regarding the non-market
strategies of firms under conditions of technological change (Gurses and
Ozcan, 2015; Funk and Hirschman, 2014; Ernkvist, 2015). The micro
and meso-levels of digital entrepreneurship and institutional change
remain understudied and partly as a consequence, we are left with little
knowledge regarding how institutional place actually happens (Peng,
2003). Specifically, more research is needed concerning how digital
entrepreneurs can accomplish institutional change when facing re-
sistance from vested interest groups.
Economic literature tends to argue that changes in formal institu-
tions such as the regulatory set-up tend to be influenced by rent seeking
actors such as incumbent monopolists who manage to shape institutions
to their benefit as they control more financial and relational resources
(Buchanan, 1980; DiMaggio, 1988). In institutional theory, this di-
lemma is usually referred to as the paradox of embedded agency: if
actors are constrained by institutions, how does institutional change
come about (Seo and Creed, 2002)?
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Scholarly work in business administration and sociology has pointed
out field preconditions that increase the likelihood of institutional
change to come about (Battilana et al., 2009), including exogenous
shocks like new technology and social upheaval (Fligstein, 1997),
perceived crises or problems within the field (Phillips et al., 2000), the
degree of heterogeneity within the field, for instance the presence of
multiple institutional orders or alternatives (Clemens and Cook, 1999).
Heterogeneity may trigger institutional conflicts and instabilities, thus
creating opportunities for institutional change (Blackburn, 1994). The
presence of potential allies that can be mobilized is another condition
enabling institutional change (Fligstein, 1997). These field conditions
will be revisited in the analysis and discussion parts of the paper.
2.2. Literature on cities and agglomerations
Apart from some notable exceptions (e.g. Florida et al., 2016;
Isenberg, 2011), little research has been devoted to how the digital shift
affects the environment in which digital entrepreneurship takes place.
More specifically, much remains in assessing the interplay between
ecosystems of digital entrepreneurship and specific spatial settings such
as cities, especially regarding the role of institutions.
A large and growing body of literature has concerned itself with
agglomerations, i.e. geographical concentrations of economic activity
(Fujita et al., 1999). Early works in this area highlighted the role of
knowledge externalities, also referred to as knowledge spillovers
(Carlino et al., 2001; Jacobs, 1969; Marshall, 1927).
Generally speaking, cities can be regarded as large and concentrated
markets, which in turn give rise to increased division of labor, i.e.
higher degrees of diversity and also improved quality of matches among
firms and workers (e.g. Helsley and Strange, 2004; Wheeler, 2001).
Hence, resources may be more efficiently allocated and reshuffled at
lower transaction costs in dense agglomerations (Porter, 1990; Sölvell
et al., 2008). As a result, there is ample evidence that geographical
concentration tends to positively affect productivity by offering access
to a wider variety of supply and demand (Ciccone and Hall, 1996).
Previous research has also shown that employment grows more rapidly
in metropolitan areas with higher degrees of industrial diversity
(Glaeser et al., 1992).
Regarding innovation and renewal, it is clear that inventors are
more inclined to cite patents created in their geographical proximity
(Jaffe, 1989) and several authors have shown that patent activity in-
creases with metropolitan size (Feldman and Audretsch, 1999). Higher
population density has also been linked to higher degrees of inventive
output (Carlino et al., 2007). Case studies also suggest that geographic
concentration tends to facilitate diffusion of tacit knowledge (Saxenian,
1994).
The case of digital entrepreneurship has been shown to be geo-
graphically concentrated in several regards (Saxenian, 1991). Early
internet start-ups were often located in regions where there was more
venture capital available (Zook, 2002). Several other geographical as-
pects of digital entrepreneurship have been explored, e.g. the critical
importance of access to skilled labor (Demir et al., 2017) and the role of
interpersonal and interfirm networks (Birley, 1985). While there are
some studies stating that different institutional logics may emerge in
different cities (Lounsbury, 2007), geographical aspects of institutional
change and digital entrepreneurship remain understudied.
There are several publications concerning the specific geographical
setting of Stockholm which explore how the city has become home to
one of the most vibrant IT clusters globally. The city is per capita the
second densest city around the world in terms of number of unicorns,
i.e. start-ups with a market cap over 1 BUSD. The emergence of
Stockholm as a highly competitive IT cluster can be tracked back many
decades to such industries as telecommunications and broadband in-
vestments (Sölvell et al., 2015). Previous literature has documented
several factors contributing to this success story, including policies to
support diffusion of personal computers at an early stage, early
investments in broadband networks, along with access to skilled labor
and business incubators in the Stockholm area (Skog et al., 2016), but
the role of institutions and institutional change has not been addressed
in greater detail.
2.3. Synthesis and research problem
As stated previously, more research is needed concerning the in-
terrelationship between digital entrepreneurship and economic ag-
glomerations. While literature on cities and agglomerations would
suggest that cities play an important role in the emergence and diffu-
sion of platform solutions and digital entrepreneurship (Florida et al.,
2016; Isenberg, 2011), this question needs to be further addressed.
This paper therefore sets out to explore the role of cities in the
emergence of digital entrepreneurship to explain how and why digital
start-ups and scale-ups grow in cities. Specifically, we are interested in
the interplay between digital entrepreneurship and institutional
change, and why such changes may come about in cities. Before turning
to the results and analysis, we next describe our method and procedures
for data collection and analysis in further detail.
3. Method
To study the emergence of digital entrepreneurship and institutional
change in a city, an empirical context with plenty of successful cases
over a sustained time period is required. Sweden, and in particular, the
capital city of Stockholm, offers a potent ground for undertaking such
research. Stockholm has developed into one of Europe's most dynamic
start-up cities (Davidson, 2015) which places second in the world in
terms of hosting billion-dollar start-ups (Temperton, 2017). One po-
tential reason for why this has become the case is Stockholm's long
history of success concerning digital entrepreneurship (Ernkvist, 2015).
Bearing these characteristics and the purpose above in mind,
Sweden and Stockholm were chosen as the empirical setting for the
study at hand. As processes of digital entrepreneurship, the creation of
start-ups, scale-ups and unicorns take considerable time, we chose to
combine contemporary data with historical cases of digital en-
trepreneurship dating back to the 1980s and 1990s. Cases of successful
digital entrepreneurship with regard to accomplishing institutional
change had to be chosen. Both Comvik and the Stockholm Stock
Exchange are such examples as both organizations managed to ac-
complish divergent change without being captivated by vested inter-
ests. Moreover, the contemporary sharing economy illustrates how di-
gital entrepreneurship seems to concentrate to Stockholm, thereby
offering further illustrations of how digital entrepreneurship grows in
cities and how new practices are diffused across sectors. In the fol-
lowing sub-sections, we describe in further detail the methods em-
ployed in these respective cases.
3.1. Historical case studies: Comvik and the Stockholm stock exchange
Comvik was an entrant firm in mobile communications which not
only introduced new technology but also worked actively to shape the
institutional set-up as the entire telecommunications sector was sub-
jected to an evolutionary process of technological and regulatory
change in the 1980s. Most of Comvik's strategic maneuvering took place
in the city of Stockholm where regulators, politicians and suppliers
were present. The same is true for the second case study concerning the
Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE), an incumbent actor which introduced
digital technology while also proactively shaping the institutional
landscape.
Large amounts of primary and secondary archival data were col-
lected and structured in a relational database (Murmann, 2003;
Padgett, 2010) using Filemaker as software. The strategy of incident
coding (Van de Ven and Poole, 1990) on multiple levels (Hekkert and
Negro, 2009) was used to further analyze the data while oral history
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interviews (Misa, 2009) were used to further the understanding of the
coded events. In total, 20 oral history interviews were conducted with
former decision makers. This data was combined with extensive ar-
chival material from both Swedish National Archives and firm specific
archives. The material was photographed, converted into PDF-format
and filed in digital form, also processing the material using OCR,
meaning that one can search for words and sentences. The software
thus enabled us to put together all documents in a chronological order
for both cases. Almost 8000 archival documents including board min-
utes, management minutes, PMs, annual reports from the 1970s, 1980s
and 1990s have been subjected to this procedure within the scope of a
larger research project. All material concerning the specific firms
(Comvik and the Stockholm Stock Exchange) were searched for in the
digital archive and subsequently extracted. These were reviewed based
on which case descriptions emerged from a combination of this sec-
ondary data and data from oral history interviews, thus enabling tri-
angulation.
3.2. The sharing economy
In the third case study, the Swedish social media landscape was
utilized to map sharing economy actors, associated sectors of the
economy as well as their spatial scope by applying Social Media
Analytics (SMA). SMA is an interdisciplinary approach for analysis of
social media data (Stieglitz et al., 2014, cf. Jung et al., 2017) that draws
upon big data analytics (cf. Chen et al., 2012; Gandomi and Haider,
2015). SMA is currently being utilized in several research disciplines
out of which innovation research represents one field where research
opportunities increasingly are explored (e.g. Akter et al., 2016; Brandt
et al., 2017; Geissinger et al., 2018; Laurell and Sandström, 2016;
Laurell and Sandström, 2017).
A dataset of 4829 social media posts including the keyword
"Delningsekonomin" (the direct translation of "The sharing economy" in
Swedish) collected between 1 April 2016 up until 31 March 2017
within the frame of a wider research project (e.g. Geissinger et al.,
2018) functioned as the empirical scope of the third case study. The
dataset only contains user-generated contents written in Swedish or
user-generated contents posted by Swedish users among text based
social media applications as this delimitation enabled a structured ap-
proach vis-à-vis the empirical setting chosen. Table 1 presents the dis-
tribution of social media data per social media platform.
Qualitative content analysis (Silverman, 2006) was applied by re-
viewing the ways in which sharing economy actors were referred to in
the material. After having categorized actors as start-ups or scale-ups,
the associated sectors of these sharing economy actors were reviewed
and thereafter, their spatial scope was determined by mapping the as-
sociated cities which individual actors have their HQ or local HQ as
well as the individual actors main target markets. In total, 121 sharing
economy actors were present in the material out of which 90 actors' HQ
or local HQ were possible to identify along with 97 sharing economy
actors' main target market. These analyses were followed by quantita-
tive content analysis by analyzing the frequency and percentage of
specific actors, sectors and their spatial scope as well as their inter-
relation.
4. Results
Below, the three cases of digital entrepreneurship covered in this
paper are described in further detail. We start with Comvik's entry into
mobile telephony and its associated institutional strategies which un-
folded in the 1980s. The Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE) is then
covered and subsequently we turn to contemporary digital en-
trepreneurship in the setting of the Swedish sharing economy.
4.1. Comvik and mobile telephony
Since the 1950s, a Swedish private company called
“Företagstelefon” had been granted permission to operate a small net-
work of mobile telephony next to the government monopoly
Televerket. Företagstelefon had been granted this unusual permission
from Televerket who was not only operating the landline network but
also regulating entry into the market.
Företagstelefon changed its name to Comvik after having been ac-
quired by Swedish entrepreneur and capitalist Jan Stenbeck. In the
1980s, the telecommunications sector became subject to an interrelated
process of technological and institutional change where e.g. the emer-
gence of mobile telephony sparked conflicts between Televerket and
Comvik. Both firms were located in the city of Stockholm, where other
key actors such as the supplier Ericsson could be found, along with
media, politicians and various regulatory bodies.
Both Televerket and Comvik foresaw a future growth in demand for
mobile telephony. Televerket developed NMT, Nordic Mobile
Telephony-system, together with Ericsson. Comvik instead bought a
system from Canada. During the time for the launching of these mobile
systems on the market several technological advancements occurred.
Automatic switches were now available and these were more effective
than the old manual switches. The latter demanded a person to connect
the calls and the former did this automatically. This detail had an initial
role in the first institutional non-market battle between Televerket and
Comvik in the early 1980s. Having developed and introduced automatic
switches, Televerket wanted to avoid competition and thus forbade
Comvik to use their technology.
Comvik responded with several proactive non-market activities di-
rected towards media and public authorities. The process included
holding Televerket accountable towards competition authorities. They
were also subject for a newspaper article were the CEO of Comvik said
that Televerket misused their role as a regulator. In the same article, the
expression “David against Goliath” was mentioned were David sym-
bolized Comvik and Goliath symbolized Televerket. Comvik worked on
several frontiers during this time including formal law through NO and
the communication authority, public opinion though media and di-
rectly to Televerket's permission unit and to Televerket's board of di-
rectors. Eventually, the department of communications ruled in favor of
Comvik, highlighting the importance of increased competition in the
market as the primary reason.
In the next conflict, Comvik tried to obtain more frequencies from
Televerket in order to expand their business. Comvik wanted fre-
quencies for their mobile telephone system, particularly for their
Skyport system for telecommunication to the USA. But Televerket as the
authority with the power over frequencies denied them that by refer-
ring to technical difficulties that would occur and make the whole
telephone network insecure. However, Televerket let the government
decide on the issue since they considered themselves biased in this issue
and that international telecommunication did require deals with for-
eign countries. This did not stop Televerket from making a re-
commendation to the government to deny Comvik's request. The reason
for this recommendation was according to Televerket that one op-
erator/system used the limited amount of frequencies. Comvik ques-
tioned this claim and initiated several activities to alter things to their
favor by approaching NO, Televerket and the department of commu-
nications while making sure to obtain extensive publicity in media
Table 1
Collected and publicly posted user-generated contents per social media plat-
form (cf. Geissinger et al., 2018).
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outlets. Finally, Comvik was granted 14 more frequencies, going from
36 to 50, (they wanted 60) through a government decision in June of
1987.
In the third round, Comvik complained to the government regarding
Ericsson's refusal to sell AIX-switches to Comvik for their GSM system.
Developed by Ericsson and Televerket, the AXE system was one of the
best at that time. While there were some suppliers on the market,
Comvik wanted to buy from Ericsson for practical reasons as Ericsson
was located in Sweden. Comvik found it strange that a private company
like Ericsson did not want to sell to them. Ericsson referred to it being
practically impossible to say yes to every buyer out there and that they
wanted to focus on Televerket for the Swedish market. Comvik again
suspected Televerket, this time for pressuring Ericsson not to sell to
Televerket's competitor. Comvik was very open with this suspicion,
communicating it both publicly, to Televerket and politicians. NO
suggested that the department for competition should approve Comviks
demands. In 1990, Marknadsdomstolen decided that Ericsson was ob-
ligated to sell AIX to Comvik and thus Comvik won the third round as
well.
In sum, Comvik used the emergence of new technology to initiate a
process of deregulation, thereby creating the market it would also
compete in. The emergence of GSM in the early 1990s implied a re-
structuring of the industry where suppliers of equipment such as
Ericsson sold to operators who were in turn regulated by a separate
independent government agency. In this case, Televerket had to com-
pete on equal terms with other players such as Comvik and Tele2. It is
therefore clear that Comvik had an important role in shaping the new
institutional order under which mobile telephony would be governed in
Sweden in the coming decades.
4.2. The Stockholm stock exchange
A recent publication in Technological Forecasting and Social Change
documents the combined technological and institutional strategies of
OM, an entrant firm offering a fully electronic stock exchange for
trading options (Ernkvist, 2015). Building on this contribution, we
describe below how the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE) became the
first stock exchange to fully implement a digital stock trading system
which included order execution. Later the SSE became the first stock
exchange in the world to change its structure from a cooperative form
to a for-profit company with open ownership, a development that made
other stock exchanges follow in the coming years (Zanotti, 2012). Also,
the SSE was one of the first actors to introduce a fully digital trading
system in 1989. OM acquired the SSE in 1998 and it is thus clear that
these two firms were part of the same process of technological and
institutional change in financial exchanges. Ernkvist (2015) described
the case of OM, we acknowledge and build upon this contribution by
covering the case of the incumbent SSE below.
First and foremost, a financial exchange is a marketplace, i.e. a place
where buyers and sellers of financial securities or other instruments -
“brokers” - meet to trade. Lee (1998, p. 26) state that the functions of a
financial exchange is the “listing, trading, information dissemination,
and various post-trade services, including clearing and settlement”. In
the case of SSE, as the de facto and de jure monopoly, it was the sole
provider of the financial infrastructure necessary for equity trading with
the exception of the clearing and settlement that was made by a third
party. This meant that of the different steps in making a “trade”, the
primary function of SSE was to match the orders of the buyers and
sellers at the exchange floor: “Traditionally, stock exchanges were orga-
nized as not-for-profit organizations, founded and owned by brokers and
dealers who managed “their“ stock exchange like an exclusive club, with
high barriers for new entrants and a regional or even national monopoly,
comparable to a medieval gild.” (Fleckner, 2005, p. 3–4).
Given the strong influence of interest groups in the financial sector
and retrospective accounts of how brokers successfully resisted im-
plementing automated trading systems at other exchanges (Gorham and
Singh, 2009; Melamed, 2009; Pardo-Guerra, 2010) the SSE's efforts to
complete the process of implementing this system is of particular in-
terest.
In Sweden, financial reform took place in several areas between
1978 and 1990 (Englund, 1990). For the functioning of the SSE, the
financial transaction tax and the gradual ability to trade shares across
international borders had a key influence.
In the first step, the old SSE was moving to new facilities in 1978,
which opened up an opportunity to replace electro-mechanical systems
with modern equipment, which, in turn, meant hiring people that
would develop and support the new systems. The IT department of the
SSE grew substantially, even when the total number of employees de-
clined in 1984 and 1987.
During this phase, the possibility to use computers and external
pressures coming from an increasing volume were the main drivers for
change. The CEO of the SSE, Bengt Rydén, was well connected politi-
cally, particularly within the Social Democrat Party. Large parts of the
SSE board were appointed politically and most of these politicians or
political appointees had little knowledge of the operations of a stock
exchange.
Rydén argued in a strategic report from 1985 that the SSE ‘is to a
great degree a mirror of the static and relatively calm environment that
persisted in Sweden before 1980’. He moreover provided an expanded
definition of stakeholders of the exchange, shifting attention from
brokers to other actors such as emitting companies and stockowners,
something that bothered many of the floor brokers.
One of the members of the board stated in a newspaper interview
that an automated trading system was good because it “moved the
competence from the legs to the brain”. The digital exchange was opened
in 1989 and when the floor closed for good in 1990 there were several
accounts of how working as a broker became “dull” and how many
brokers, who excelled at the old skills relevant for floor trading, were
made redundant. Nonetheless, as the system became stable the growing
pains declined and the critique stopped.
When implementing the system and subsequently turning the SSE
into the world's first privately owned stock exchange, the CEO Bengt
Rydén used many different strategies. He pointed out the efficiency
gains to be obtained from using new technology, while also building
alliances with various interest groups such as bankers, regulators and
politicians. Being firmly rooted in the social democratic movement also
turned out to be a vital asset in implementing these changes. When OM
acquired the SSE in 1998, they kept the successor of the SSE system as it
was highly successful. They also sold it to other stock exchanges around
the world in subsequent years.
4.3. The sharing economy in Stockholm and Sweden
In terms of how the Swedish sharing economy has evolved, the in-
itial dominance of global players such as Airbnb and Uber was quickly
followed by initiatives from local actors drawn from Sweden's vibrant
startup scene (Felländer et al. (2015). When taken together, the con-
temporary sharing economy in Sweden today is therefore characterized
by a multitude of sharing economy platforms even though orientations
differ substantially (Laurell and Sandström, 2017).
Fig. 1 presents the interconnection between start-up and scale-up
sharing economy actors, their associated sectors as well as their spatial
scope in terms of the associated cities which individual actors have
their HQ or local HQ as well as the individual actors main target
market. As the figure illustrate, a total of 23 sharing economy actors
representing scale-ups and 66 sharing economy actors representing
start-ups were identified. Despite the higher amount of sharing
economy start-ups, the ways in which the two categories of sharing
economy actors create engagement among users in social media is
evenly distributed as start-ups amounted to 59.6% of the total en-
gagement while scale-ups totaled 40.4%. With regards to individual
actors, the ways in which they engage in social media differs quite
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substantially in both categories, as Uber and Swopshop dominate their
two respective categories while the remaining sharing economy actors
attract a more evenly distributed engagement throughout the analyzed
time period covering 12-months.
In terms of the associated sectors, scale-up sharing economy actors
only dominate in the mobility and leisure sector in terms of the en-
gagement they generate while the reaming sectors are dominated by
start-up sharing economy actors. In relation to the actors and associated
sectors spatial features, a considerable concentration of HQ and local
HQ among both scale-ups and start-ups is found to the capital
Stockholm as illustrated in Table 2. With regard to the other cities
which also where identified, start-ups dominate and scale-ups are re-
latively uncommon except in Gothenburg, the second largest city in
Sweden. In close relation, the target market for both scale-ups and start-
ups is predominantly Sweden even though sharing economy actors
targeting specific cities, Europe or having a global ambition also were
identified as illustrated in Table 3.
5. Analysis and discussion
The empirical section illustrates several aspects of the interplay
between digital entrepreneurship and the functioning of cities. One
central aspect concerns the efficiency of cities as locations for economic
renewal and another aspect is related to institutional renewal. The case
descriptions show that cities form a fertile ground for institutional
changes to take place, including changes in both formal and informal
institutions. In the coming sub-sections, we revisit the field conditions
that are likely to contribute to institutional change and highlight how
and why cities such as Stockholm fulfill these criteria and thus offer
factor conditions that contribute to institutional change and successful
digital entrepreneurship. The field conditions identified by previous
research include exogenous shocks such as technological change
(Fligstein, 1997), perceived crises or problems (Phillips et al., 2000),
the degree of heterogeneity, i.e. the presence of multiple institutional
orders or alternatives (1994) and the presence of potential allies
(Fligstein, 1997).
5.1. Exogenous shocks and new technology
As can be seen in the empirical data, both Comvik and the SSE were
enacting their combinations of technological and institutional en-
trepreneurship in the city of Stockholm. Fig. 1, Table 2 and Table 3
concerning the sharing economy show how sharing economy firms in
Sweden are predominantly concentrated to the Stockholm area, while
some firms also operate in Malmö and in Gothenburg, also larger cities
in Sweden. These firms are introducing new practices in established
industries in the form of e.g. car sharing, accommodation and cloth
swapping. Hence, the introduction of sharing economy practices can be
regarded as a combination of technological and institutional change
(Laurell and Sandström, 2016, 2018) where new practices are in-
troduced in established sectors.
In all our cases, the emergence of new technology created a form of
exogenous shock, imposing a need for change within the studied fields.
Also, the induced shock came in a city prior to gaining a foothold in
other parts of the country. Technology is more likely to be developed or
introduced in a denser and more knowledge intense geographical area
such as a city (Carlino et al., 2007; Jaffe, 1989).
5.2. The perception of a crisis
Both the SSE and the Comvik case exhibit tendencies of a growing
perception of crises. External pressures from internationalization, the
possibility to use computers and the simultaneous demand for handling
increasing volumes put the SSE in a position where members of the field
gradually started to perceive the established order of things as dys-
functional. The CEO, Bengt Rydén, argued that the previous, limited use
of computers and the prevailing institutional logic were products of the
past and that a restructuration was necessary.
The telecommunications sector was subject to a similar perception
of a crisis in the early 1980s. The government monopoly Televerket was
subject to extensive criticism for being inefficient, lacking service-
mindedness and for misusing its position as a monopoly regulating it-
self. Discontent with Televerket was widespread in these years and
Comvik made sure to capitalize upon these opinions, arguing that
competition and free markets were part of the solution.
The relative density of people and diversity of actors present in a
city, are factors that contribute to the diffusion of a crisis sentiment.
The presence of media outlets, corporate headquarters and political
authorities seems to have formed preconditions where a joint percep-
tion of crisis could prevail, and where it is possible for institutional
entrepreneurs to build an alternative vision.
5.3. Degree of institutional heterogeneity
One enabling condition for institutional change is the co-existence
of multiple institutional settings. A more economically diverse area
such as a larger city is arguably more likely to contain a sufficient de-
gree of variety where it is possible for new practices to be diffused. Our
data indeed suggests that this is the case as sharing economy firms are
primarily found in cities.
Starting with the case of the sharing economy, we see how early
entrants such as Airbnb and Uber gained initial footholds in larger ci-
ties. Our data shows how the platform logic induced by these actors is
spreading to other sectors such as fashion and clothing, food and on-
demand services. The expanding scope of the sharing economy seems
more likely to occur in a city where the population has been subjected
to several different institutional logics and where the platform model
has already been introduced in several areas previously. Digital en-
trepreneurship induces new practices that are diffused in cities and
Table 2
Headquarter location of start-up and scale-up sharing economy actors.
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spread to new fields, resulting in new consumer behavior and changes
of informal institutions.
Changes of formal institutions also seem more likely to occur in a
city. The examples of Comvik and the SSE constitute illustrative ex-
amples. The combination of technological and institutional change is
subject to high transaction costs as the process is highly uncertain and
involves a multitude of actors. The co-location of key actors in a field
that is undergoing institutional change seems to be an enabling factor.
Negotiations can take place continuously and ambiguities can be han-
dled more effectively when operating in the same geographical area.
The example of Comvik shows how the presence of a wide array of
actors facilitated Comvik's political maneuvering. When Televerket re-
jected Comvik's requests the firm merely chose to target other actors
such as various government entities, while also making themselves
heard in media, capitalizing upon a public opinion increasingly hostile
towards the incumbent monopolist Televerket. These strategies were
enacted successfully by both the SSE and Comvik, making it possible to
avoid regulatory capture, which is often something that blocks in-
stitutional change.,
5.4. Presence of potential allies
Previous research has pointed out numerous efficiencies of dense
agglomerations such as cities, including increased division of labor and
higher degrees of diversity along with improved access to skilled em-
ployees (Helsley and Strange, 2004; Wheeler, 2001). In these ways,
cities contain the presence of potential allies for those actors who want
to accomplish institutional change.
It is clear from both the cases of SSE's digitalization and Comvik's
entry into mobile telephony that both firms benefited from having ac-
cess to a larger labor market where increased needs for competence
renewal and recruitment could be satisfied by Stockholm and the sur-
rounding region. For example, in the SSE case, the IT department grew
substantially, even when the total number of employees declined. In the
SSE case, it is also clear how the CEO Bengt Rydén could avoid being
controlled by various interest groups such as brokers, mainly as he had
considerable political connections that could be used.
A second aspect of density concerns network effects. All the ex-
amples covered above concern various forms of platforms, i.e. two-
sided markets which reinforce each other. Comvik launched a system
for mobile telephony in competition with Televerket, both depending
on network effects and increasing returns for their successful growth.
The SSE's electronic system for trading was subject to similar increasing
returns to adoption (Arthur, 1996). Sharing economy platforms depend
on supply and demand which reinforce each other. Obtaining a critical
mass of participants in these platforms is easier in a more geo-
graphically dense agglomeration such as a city. Hence, the mobilization
of allies seems to be easier to accomplish in a city as cities contain
higher degrees of diversity, thus providing further opportunities for
institutional change.
6. Concluding remark, limitations and directions for future
research
This paper has explored how and why digital entrepreneurship
emerges in cities. Drawing upon multiple cases of digital en-
trepreneurship in the city of Stockholm in Sweden, we show that cities
offer a fertile ground for the emergence of digital start-ups and scale-
ups.
First, we note that the relative density and diversity of cities con-
stitutes a critical enabling condition for digital entrepreneurship. Access
to venture capital and skilled labor makes it possible to build compe-
tencies in those settings were skill renewal is critical. Also, as digital
platforms are subject to network effects, it seems like these network
effects are more easily generated in a dense agglomeration. These
mechanisms are clearly illustrated in our empirical data and have also
been highlighted by previous literature.
Our main contribution lies in illustrating and stating that cities
contribute to digital entrepreneurship by offering the field conditions
required for the accomplishment of changes in both formal and in-
formal institutions. The cases reviewed above illustrate how and why
cities contribute to digital entrepreneurship. The relative economic
density, diversity and knowledge intensity together form the field
conditions (Battilana et al., 2009) usually required for altering both
formal and informal institutions. Exogenous shocks in the form of new
technology is more likely to be introduced and further diffused in a city
and it is easier for a perception of field crisis, especially as cities are
more likely to contain a multitude of institutional orders, which in turn
also implies the existence of potential allies for those digital en-
trepreneurs who seek to accomplish institutional change. Also, cities
offer a proximity for key actors in a field including suppliers, regulators,
politicians and institutional entrepreneurs, making it possible for them
to interact continuously, thereby building trust and resolving ambi-
guities that are related to uncertain processes of interrelated techno-
logical and institutional change.
Our contribution therefore lies in highlighting an important reason
why cities contribute to the emergence of digital start-ups and scale-
ups. Widespread access to broadband, smartphones and other ICT's has
caused some scholars to state that location is no longer important. Our
findings suggest the opposite, location is important. Joel Mokyr stated
that ‘what seems to be failures of technology are often the failures of
institutions’ (Mokyr, 2003, p. 60). We conclude that cities matter for
digital entrepreneurship because they seem to offer the field conditions
required for accomplishing institutional change and to avoid regulatory
capture.
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